

## SOLZHENITSYN'S TWO CENTURIES TOGETHER, Part 19

WHO ARE THE UKRAINIANS? - Part One, from Kievan Rus<sup>1</sup> to the Polish partitions

Essay by Peter Brooke first published in *Church and State*, No.148, April-June, 2022 Downloaded from <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/solzhenitsyn>

### WERE THE 'RUSSIAN POGROMS' RUSSIAN?

At the end of the last article in my Russian-Jewish series I said I would write about Ber Borochov and Vladimir Jabotinsky. Borochov (born in Poltava, in modern Ukraine) was the founder and leading theorist of the Jewish Social Democratic and Labour Party-Poale Zion (ESDRP-PZ) which eventually gave birth to Mapai and its successor, the Israeli Labour Party, which ruled Israel from 1948 to 1977; while Zabolotinsky (born in Odessa, in modern Ukraine) was the founder and leading theorist of 'Revisionist Zionism', which inspired the 'right wing' movements that have dominated Israeli politics from 1977 to the present day. This article would have taken the story where Solzhenitsyn did not go, into the land of Palestine. However recent events - the Russian intervention in Ukraine - tell me I haven't paid enough attention to the place where the 'Russian-Jewish' confrontations I've been describing occurred.

The 'Pale of Settlement' - the area in which Jews were allowed to live in the Russian Empire and where they were living in large numbers, the area in which the most dramatic pogroms occurred - corresponds more or less to modern Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. If these are to be regarded as having a national and moral existence distinct from that of 'Russia' then instead of Russian pogroms we should be talking about Ukrainian, Belarusian or Moldovan pogroms. The Baltic states were also included in the Pale of Settlement and they had their own pogroms but I am following Solzhenitsyn in concentrating on the lands that were regarded as 'Russian.'

It has of course been firmly believed for a long time that the pogroms throughout the area were deliberately fomented by agents working for the Russian government but, as previous articles in this series have shown, modern scholarship broadly agrees with Solzhenitsyn that this is not true, that, to quote Solzhenitsyn on the subject, discussing the Kishinev pogrom:

*'Why has the simple truth about the Kishinev pogrom seemed to be insufficient? Probably because the truth would have revealed the real nature of the government - an organism that had become sclerotic, guilty of anti-Jewish provocations [brimades in the French translation] but which remained unsure of itself, incoherent. So, with the help of outright lies, it has been represented as a deliberate persecutor, sure of itself, wicked. Such an enemy could only deserve a complete annihilation.'*<sup>2</sup>

Kishinev of course, as modern Chisinau, is the capital of Moldova and the man most responsible for working up the feeling that led to the pogrom - Pavel Krushevan - was very

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<sup>1</sup> By now readers will know that the Ukrainian names for 'Vladimir' and 'Kiev' are 'Volodymyr' and Kyiv. I've never mastered any consistent method for the transcription of Russian or Ukrainian names or words and the spellings I use are perfectly arbitrary. They should be taken as - hopefully recognisable - symbols of the persons, places or things they represent.

<sup>2</sup> Alexandre Soljénitsyne: *Deux siècles ensemble, t.1, Juifs et Russes avant la révolution*, Eds Fayard, 2002. p.372. My translation from the French translation of the Russian original. The theme runs through the series but see in particular the discussion of Hans Rogger and John Klier in the article on the Derzhavin Memorandum - *Church and State*, No.133, July-September, 2018, now available on my website at <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/solzhenitsyn/derzhavin/>

much a Moldovan patriot, though not, so far as I know, an advocate of separation from Russia. It was also most probably Krushevan who was behind the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (probably initially as a sort of literary joke), not, as has been very widely asserted, the chief of the Russian secret police in Paris, Pyotr Rachkovsky.<sup>3</sup>

But the heartland of the late nineteenth/ early twentieth century pogroms was the area now known as 'Ukraine' and in the context of the first and second world wars, the slaughter reached a level far beyond even the 1905 pogroms (centred on Odessa) I discussed in the last article in this series. So what is it that distinguishes the Ukrainians (formerly known as 'Little Russians') from the Russians (formerly known as 'Great Russians') apart from the existence in their midst of a large Jewish population?

## KIEVAN RUS'

Both Russians and Ukrainians trace their own historical and cultural continuity back to the Kingdom of Rus', centred on Kiev, and the conversion of its King Vladimir to Christianity in 988 AD. Vladimir had previously been a persecutor of Christians. According to Dimitry Pospelovsky: 'the early part of Vladimir's reign was marked by the only known period of Russian history when human sacrifices were made to pagan gods and Christians were actively persecuted.'<sup>4</sup> He says that Vladimir was ruling over a diverse mixture of Slavonic, Finnic and Lithuanian tribes and initially had erected in Kiev a collection of statues representing all the different gods of these different peoples (something similar existed in the Ka'bah in Mecca until Muhammad got his hands on it). But he seems to have decided, like Constantine before him, that a totalitarian religion - a religion which made exclusive claims to the truth about divine things - was the best means of uniting a diverse people. The story has it that he was confronted with a choice between four such faiths - Christianity as promoted by Constantinople, Christianity as promoted by 'the Germans', Judaism or Islam. He chose Christianity as promoted by Constantinople. It's interesting to note the choice offered between German Christianity (the Catholic Church) and Greek Christianity (the Orthodox Church), Old Rome and New Rome. There were already very marked tensions between the two but the date conventionally used to mark the final division between them - the mutual exchange of anathemas - 1054, comes in the following century.

Rus' was not the first Slav kingdom to convert to Christianity. In the ninth century, Cyril and Methodius, the 'apostles of the Slavs', started out from Constantinople to Moravia, where they entered into conflict with missionaries responsible to Rome. But Cyril was to die in Rome and Methodius became bishop of a diocese (Pannonia) responsible to Rome. Both the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches regard them as Saints. The first Slav kingdom converted to Christianity

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<sup>3</sup> See my essay on Kishinev in *Church and State*, No.142, October-December, 2020, <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/solzhenitsyn/pogroms-4/> The Pyotr Rachkovsky thesis is argued in Norman Cohn: *Warrant for Genocide*, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967 (republished as a Penguin paperback in 1970).

<sup>4</sup> Dimitry Pospelovsky: *The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia*, Crestwood NY, St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1998, p.19. Apart from Pospelovsky my main source for this article will be different articles in the very impressive *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, available online at <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com>. The Encyclopedia was initiated in Paris by the Ukrainian emigré Shevchenko Scientific Society under the direction of the Ukrainian nationalist Volodymyr Kubijovyč, one of the organisers of the SS Galicia Division in 1943.

under Constantinople was Bulgaria in 864, closely followed by Serbia. Poland - or at least the Polish King and his court - was converted from Rome in 966.

Kievan Rus' derived its importance from its situation on the Dnieper (Ukrainian Dnipro) river, part of the 'Varangian route' which linked Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and thence to Constantinople. At its height the principality covered almost the whole route without, however, actually reaching the Black Sea. The coastal area - including Crimea (already converted as it happens to Christianity) was held by a Turkic people, the Cumans, or Polovtsians. The *Lay of Igor's Campaign* (late twelfth century if we accept its authenticity) tells the story of an unsuccessful late twelfth century campaign against the Cumans. It is the basis of Borodin's opera *Prince Igor*, with its famous 'Polovtsian Dances'.

Kievan Rus', more or less united under Vladimir (r980-1015), Yaroslav the Wise (r1036-1054) and Vladimir Monomakh (r1113-25), nonetheless tended to fall apart in rival principalities, definitively so in the late twelfth century. Without going into details (of which there are many!), two important cultural centres emerged with resonance for the future - Novgorod 'the Great' (there were other Novgorods - 'new towns') in the North, along the Varangian route, and Galicia-Volhynia, which connected Kiev on the westward land route across the Carpathian mountains to Hungary and Poland and the area of West Roman influence. Novgorod could be described as the cradle of what was to become Muscovite Russia, Galicia-Volhynia as the cradle, or at least the stronghold, of what was to become much later Ukrainian nationalism.

The whole area was overwhelmed by the arrival of the 'Golden Horde' - the Western section of the Mongol Empire which stretched eastward as far as China and Southward to Persia and Mesopotamia. It first appeared in the Kievan territories in 1223 on a plundering raid but came in more definitively under Batu Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan. Kiev was sacked and its residents massacred in 1240. 1240 was also the year that Prince Alexander (nineteen years old at the time) saved Novgorod from the Swedes at the Battle of the Neva, thus getting the name Alexander Nevsky. In 1242 he saved Novgorod from the German and Estonian Knights of the Livonian Order, in the battle on the frozen Lake Peipus, memorably portrayed in Eisenstein's film. In fighting the Catholic West, Alexander was rejecting an appeal of the Pope to fight against the more formidable Tatars. According to Pospelovsky, the Metropolitan of Kiev, Kirill II, persuaded his patron, the Galician-Volhynian Prince, Daniel Romanovich to do likewise. It was under Daniel that the town of Lviv was founded, and under his son, Lev Danylovich (r1264-1301) that Lviv became his capital.

The Tatar yoke, so long as it was acknowledged, was relatively light. It mainly consisted of requiring the payment of a tribute. Nonetheless Metropolitan Kirill did not live in the now devastated Kiev, and his successor, the Greek Maxim, while maintaining the title, Metropolitan of Kiev, transferred his seat in 1299 northwards to Vladimir, on the Klyazma River. Vladimir itself was in a poor state after being sacked by the Tatars in 1238. This transfer of the Kiev metropolitanate northward prompted Lev's son, with the approval of Constantinople, Yurii to establish a rival metropolitanate in Halych (South of Lviv in what is now the oblast of Ivano-Frankivsk) but this was hardly a great success since when the Volhynian, Peter, supported by Lev, went to Constantinople he was directed by the Patriarch to go to Moscow, where he died. The separate Halych metropolitanate fell into disuse.

In all these developments we see the separation of 'Muscovy' on the one hand and, on the other, Galicia-Volhynia from their former heartland of Kiev. The separation was hardened when the area covered by Galicia-Volhynia came under the domination of Poland and Lithuania. This is, I think, the real historical distinction between the people who became 'Ukrainians' and the people who became 'Russians'. The Ukrainians are the inheritors of Kievan Rus' who came under Polish (and Lithuanian, but most importantly Polish) domination.

## POLAND AND LITHUANIA

In 1340, the last Prince of Galicia-Volhynia, Yuri II Boleslav, was murdered, poisoned by his boyars. Galicia fell into disarray and was fought over by different Galician factions, Hungary and Poland until, through an agreement between Poland, Hungary and Lithuania, it was incorporated into Poland in 1387. After struggles with Poland, Lithuania gained control of Volhynia in 1370.<sup>5</sup>

Lithuania had emerged as a power in the thirteenth century in conflict with the Teutonic Knights who had moved into the area on the Baltic now known as East Prussia. The Lithuanians at that time were still pagan but they were becoming Christian, using the Eastern rite, partly perhaps in reaction to the Teutonic Knights and partly through the influence of Volhynia. They had already, prior to 1340, taken some of the Volhynian lands and they had the support of the boyars who killed Yuri. They constituted, together with Poland, a bulwark against the Tatars. They also took more eastward areas of the old Kievan Rus'. According to Pospielovsky (p.81): 'In general, Kiev's fate in the period between the Mongol conquest in 1241 and its annexation by the Lithuanian prince Vitoft in the early fifteenth century remains unclear.' But the Encyclopedia of Ukraine entry on Kyiv has it annexed to Lithuania from 1362 through to 1482, when it was again sacked by the Tatars.

In 1386, more or less coinciding with the incorporation of Galicia into Poland, the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagello married the Polish Queen Hedwig, converted to Catholicism and became King of Poland as King Wladyslaw II. Catholicism became the only legal religion of the Grand Duchy. The result was a war with his cousin Vitautas (Pospielovsky's 'Vitoft'), finally resulting in the Union of Horodlo in 1413, which kept the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in existence as a distinct moral entity, albeit subject to the Polish King, and allowed the continuation of the Orthodox Church. To quote the Encyclopedia's entry on the Union of Horodlo: 'Under the terms of the agreement the Catholic nobles of Lithuania were granted equality with their Polish counterparts; Orthodox (mostly Ruthenian) nobles, however, were consigned to second class status and prohibited from full participation in state affairs.'

The Encyclopedia says of the term 'Ruthenian', used here: 'The name Rutheni came to be applied to the inhabitants of Kyivan Rus' as a result of the medieval practice of giving newly encountered peoples the names of extinct ancient peoples. Boris Unbegaun has suggested that the attested Latin Rucenus, a rendering of the Old Ukrainian rusyn, was instrumental in the selection of the name Ruthenus. The first use of the word Ruteni in reference to the inhabitants of Rus' was in the Annales Augustiani of 1089. For centuries thereafter Rutheni was used in

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<sup>5</sup> I should explain that Galicia and Volhynia are flexible geographical entities. The present day 'Volyn' is an oblast in the extreme west of Ukraine but at one time it stretched through the neighbouring oblast of Rivne into Zhytomir, abutting the region of Kiev.

Latin as the designation of all East Slavs, particularly Ukrainians and Belarusians. In the 16th century the word more clearly began to be associated with the Ukrainians and Belarusians of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as distinct from the Muscovites (later known as Russians), who were designated *Moscovitae*.<sup>6</sup> I shall use the term 'Ruthenian' to refer to the Eastern Slav subjects of Poland until it seems to me, some time in the seventeenth century, that the term 'Ukrainian' begins to be appropriate.

In parenthesis it may be noted that 1380, coincidental with the Polish-Lithuanian capture of Galicia-Volhynia, was the year of the Battle of Kulikovo, the victory of the Muscovite Prince Dmitri Donskoi, traditionally seen as the moment of the liberation of Muscovy from the Tatar Yoke. More or less at the same time, Bulgaria and most of Serbia fell to the Ottomans.

## THE RUTHENIANS AND ORTHODOXY

It isn't immediately obvious to me why the Ruthenians clung so stubbornly to Orthodoxy. Constantinople had ceased to be a substantial political force since 1205, when it had fallen to the Catholics in the Fourth Crusade. It had recovered its independence since, but in a very weakened state. The fourteenth century saw the debate in Constantinople over 'hesychasm' (the monastic way of silence) which was to give Orthodoxy a distinct intellectual character that stands it in good stead at the present time. The hesychast movement was to have great influence in the Balkan lands and in the emerging Muscovite Russia but, so far as I can see had little influence among the Ruthenians, whose political and intellectual interests, even as we shall see among the Orthodox, lay westwards, to Poland and beyond, rather than Southwards towards the Balkans or Eastward towards Muscovy. As a result of this westward orientation, the Ruthenians lost their nobility, who became increasingly polonised. And yet, as Pospelovsky says (p.85): 'Even at the end of the seventeenth century, after all the coercion to push the Orthodox into Roman Catholicism ... the entire Lithuanian territory had only 700 Roman Catholic, as against 5,000 Orthodox churches.'

Constantinople fell to the Ottomans in 1453 but prior to that, at the Council of Florence-Ferrara, the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Moscow-based Metropolitan of Kiev, had submitted to Rome. Even though Constantinople soon repudiated the union with Rome, Moscow separated from it. As a result the Patriarch of Constantinople, in 1469, established a new Metropolitanate of Kiev, albeit now based in the Lithuanian capital, Vil'na (modern Vilnius). This marked a further separation of what we might call Ruthenian Orthodoxy from Russian Orthodoxy. But Orthodoxy in the area was kept alive not by the hierarchy - always suspected of a romanising tendency - and certainly not by the nobility, but more by the peasantry and by 'brotherhoods' made up of craftsmen, merchants, lower clergy and monastics. Despite periodical destruction by different political forces the Kiev Caves monastery continued as an important symbol of

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<sup>6</sup> This particular entry in the Encyclopedia is written by the Ukrainian-Canadian historian, John-Paul Himka, a particularly interesting writer on Ukrainian nationalism, who will feature prominently in the next part of this article. In his essay 'Young radicals and independent statehood: the idea of a Ukrainian nation-state, 1890-1895', *Slavic Review*, Summer 1982, Vol 41, No 2, Himka says: 'At least until the turn of the century, the Eastern-rite, Ukrainian-speaking inhabitants of Austria-Hungary referred to themselves as "Ruthenians" (*rusyny*) and to their conationals across the Russian border as "Ukrainians" (*ukraintsi*). As of 1900, nationally conscious Ukrainians in Galicia shunned this distinction and began referring to themselves, too, as "Ukrainians." The formulation of the goal of national statehood contributed to the terminological reorientation.'

Orthodox integrity. A very interesting style of icon-painting developed, specially in Lviv. The 'Pechersk icon' - showing the founders of the Kiev Caves monastery, SS Anthony and St Theodosius, under the protection of the Mother of God, is one of the most popular Ukrainian folk icons.<sup>7</sup>

The fourteenth century, the period of the incorporation of the Ruthenians into Poland, was also the period of large scale influx of Jews into Poland, following the Great Plague in Germany and the massacres of Jews that accompanied it. We are moving into the territory of the first article in my Russian-Jewish series - *A Polish Prologue* - and the crude pattern I outlined then of Orthodox peasantry, Catholic nobility, Jewish merchant, shopkeeper, tavernkeeper, artisan, landlord's agent.<sup>8</sup>

The position of the Orthodox worsened considerably in 1569, with the 'Union of Lubln' which turned the relation between Poland and Lithuania from a confederal to a federal union. The Orthodox aristocracy lost the right to sit in the senate, the Rada, which had a right of veto over the decisions of the King - extended in the seventeenth century to every individual senate member. In 1564, the Polish King, Sigismund Augustus II, invited the Jesuits to Poland, where they established a network of schools and colleges offering free education, with no obligation to convert to Rome. This was hugely attractive both to the Protestant element that had developed in Poland and to the more ambitious Orthodox elements, and of course it brought their children into a strong Catholic sphere of influence. The pull towards Rome, already strong among the Ruthenian aristocracy and higher clergy, produced in 1596, the 'Union of Brest' - the formation of the 'Uniate' church, which recognised the headship of the Pope and that it was the Catholic Church that possessed the fulness of the Truth, but retained elements of the Eastern rite deemed to be compatible with Catholic dogma. They were still, however, regarded as very much second class Catholics and their nobility were not given the same veto powers as their peers in the Rada. Pospelovsky comments (p.88): 'This was the reason most Lithuanian aristocrats converted to Western Rite Roman Catholicism in the course of the seventeenth century, and particularly those who had joined the Unia - as a result the Unia became known in Poland as the peasants' religion.'

## COSSACKS

Oppressed by a Catholic nobility and by Jewish middlemen, many Orthodox Ruthenian peasants fled eastwards to 'Zaporizhia' - the 'land beyond the rapids' of the Dnieper river, land that was outside the direct control of the Polish or Russian governments. Here they were in contact with the already established Cossacks. The word 'Cossack' apparently derives from the Turkic word 'Kazak', as in Kazakstan', meaning 'free man'. The Cossacks were self governing but ready to sell their services to the established states, mainly to guard them against the

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<sup>7</sup> See eg Ljudmilla Milyaeva: *The Ukrainian Icon*, Bournemouth, Parkstone and St Petersburg, Aurora, 1996 and Lidia Lykhach and Mykola Kornienko: *Ukrainian folk icons from the land of Shevchenko*, Kyiv, Rodovid, 2000. I have some examples of the folk icons on my website at <http://www.peterbrooke.org/art-and-religion/icons-index/icons-4.html>. A favourite theme in Ruthenian churches is the Last Judgment and John-Paul Himka has written on this: John Paul Himka: *Last Judgment iconography in the Carpathians*, University of Toronto Press, 2018.

<sup>8</sup> *Church and State*, No.132, April-June, 2018, <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/solzhenitsyn/prologue/>

Crimean Tatars, but also on occasion to support one side or the other in the numerous complicated wars of the area. The Tatars still held the whole Black Sea and Azov coastline including, of course, Crimea. It is at this point, I think, that the word 'Ukraine', meaning frontier, begins to be relevant. When Ukrainians talk about 'Ukraine' they are referring to the name of a country; when Russians talk about 'the Ukraine' they are referring to a frontier - the land separating Poland and Russia and the Tatars. On the Russian side of the frontier there were the 'Don Cossacks', and on the Polish side there were the so-called 'registered Cossacks', notionally loyal to the Polish army, but Orthodox, largely made up of dissidents from the Polish system. The 'Zaporozhian host' of escaped Orthodox serfs constituted a third Cossack force, unrecognised by the Polish government.

Another, more intellectual, defence of Orthodoxy was mounted through the establishment, largely under Cossack patronage, of the 'Greek Slavonic Academy of Kiev', opened in 1632, which, under Peter Moghila, a monk in the Kiev Caves monastery who was made Metropolitan of Kiev in 1633, became possibly the first serious centre of theological learning in Russian Church history. Peter, however, who came from a princely family in Moldavia, had himself received a thoroughly Catholic education in Western schools and universities. The teaching in the Kiev Academy (for a priesthood performing offices in Church Slavonic for largely Ukrainian speaking congregations) was in Latin and had a distinctly scholastic character. He was basically using Catholic weapons to counter Catholicism and the Unia. In 1997, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine - still under Moscow but with a large degree of autonomy - declared him to be a saint but this has not been generally accepted throughout the Orthodox world.

The 'Khmelnitsky rising' of 1648, with its devastating effect on the situation of the Jews in Poland, is discussed in my earlier 'Polish prologue' article. It established at least briefly an independent state - the 'hetmanate' - that straddled the Dnieper and could be seen as the first Ukrainian state if we don't count Kievan Rus' itself and its various derived principalities prior to the Tatar assault and the Polish-Lithuanian takeover. However, the two banks of the Dnieper, the right (West) and left (East)<sup>9</sup>, fell out with each other in what Ukrainian historians call 'the ruin.' The Western Cossacks tended to ally with the Poles, the Eastern Cossacks with the Russians, so that eventually the territory East of the river fell into the Muscovite sphere of influence. But this was by no means a simple process. At the Battle of Poltava in 1709, when the Russian Tsar Peter I ('the Great') defeated the Swedish Charles XII, the Cossacks of the hetmanate under the hetman Ivan Mazepa, was fighting for Charles (after previously following a fairly consistent pro-Moscow policy). He fled to Moldavia, then in Ottoman hands, where he died.<sup>10</sup>

By this time, it should be said, Moscow was back in communion with Constantinople (in 1589, when the Patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremiah II, acting according to Pospelovsky, p.67, under duress, established Moscow as an autonomous patriarchy. In 1686, recognised by Constantinople in 1687, the Kiev metropolitanate was brought under the control of the Moscow patriarchate. This is the act which the present Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew,

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<sup>9</sup> Which can be a little confusing because of course looking at a map the West is on the left and the East is on the right.

<sup>10</sup> Moldavia and Wallachia make up modern Rumania. They had submitted voluntarily to the Ottomans and were therefore allowed a certain degree of independence, becoming a citadel of Orthodox culture. Modern Moldova is part of Moldavia that was incorporated into the Soviet Union. and is now an independent state.

rescinded when he recognised the autonomy of the Kyiv patriarchate. It occurred at a time when the Russian church was in some disarray through the schism with the 'Old Believers' prompted by liturgical reforms introduced by the Patriarch Nikon. In the early eighteenth century, in effect from 1700, formally from 1721, Peter suppressed the Moscow patriarchate, replacing it with the 'Holy Synod', which could be seen as simply a government department. The present Moscow patriarchate came into existence as part of the February revolution in 1917.<sup>11</sup>

The 'spiritual regulation' which established the Holy Synod was, as it happens, devised by the Rector of the Kiev academy, Theophan Prokopovich. The twentieth century Orthodox theologian, George Florovsky in his *The Ways of Russian Theology*, complains that the early eighteenth century saw what he calls a 'ukrainisation' of the Russian church. But where Moghila was suspected of having a Catholic caste of mind, Prokopovich, also educated in European universities, had reacted strongly against Catholicism and, according to Florovsky, was not just influenced by Protestantism but should be seen as part of the history of Protestantism.

The education of the higher clergy in Russia was now remodelled along the lines of the Kiev Academy. Russia was getting a taste of Western classical culture.

Poland suppressed its registered Cossacks in 1700 and recovered control of the western side of the Dnieper in 1714. The area had been devastated by the wars and the Poles set about repopulating it. Following the Encyclopedia of Ukraine account ('History of Ukraine'):

'Peasants from northwestern Ukraine, especially Volhynia, were attracted there by 15-to-20-year exemptions from corvée and other obligations. With them came Orthodox and Uniate clergy. Cossackdom, however, was not allowed to develop. The towns that were re-established were largely inhabited by Jews, who earned their living as innkeepers, artisans, and merchants. Polish gentry were largely attendants at the magnates' courts, and leaseholders or stewards managed their estates. At the peak of the social order were the few wealthy magnate families that owned huge latifundia. For much of the 18th century the Right Bank was a typical noble-dominated society, marked by lack of central authority, oligarchic politics, and extreme exploitation of the peasantry.'

There were periodical peasant revolts known as 'haidamakas', especially after the corvée system (forced unpaid labour) was reintroduced:

'The most widespread and bloodiest was the so-called Kollivshchyna rebellion of 1768, when the Poles were engaged in another war with Russia ... Thousands of Polish nobles, Jews, and Catholic clergy were massacred. Fearing that rebellion would spread into its possessions, the Russian government sent forces to quell it. Thus ended the last great uprising of the Ukrainian peasantry against the Polish nobles.'

This of course was on the eve of the collapse of the Polish state when, between 1772 and 1795, it was divided up between Austria, Russia and Prussia.

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<sup>11</sup> I gave an account of the creation of the Moscow patriarchate in 1917, together with a brief account of the earlier history in my essay 'The Moscow Patriarchate and the Bolshevik Revolution', *Problems* no 32, 2017, <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/moscow/> Interestingly, the 'Spiritual Regulation' under which the Holy Synod was formed was drawn up by Feofan (or Theophan) (Prokopovich), a professor in the Kiev Academy.



On the left (East) bank of the Dnieper the Cossacks continued to have a semi-independent existence. The 'hetmanate', derived from Khmel'nitsky, occupied and had limited sovereignty over the areas corresponding to the modern Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts in the North of the modern Ukraine, on the border with Belarus.<sup>12</sup> Relations with the Russian government were determined by the 'Hetman Articles', starting with the Treaty of Pereislav made with Khmel'nitsky in 1654. The articles were renewed with every successive hetman and steadily inflected in Moscow's favour, which also meant a steady conversion of the ruling Cossack elders into a landowning aristocracy on the Russian model and the reduction of ordinary peasants and Cossacks to a state of serfdom. In 1764, under Catherine II ('the Great'), the office of hetman was abolished and replaced by a Moscow controlled 'Little Russian Collegium'.

South of the hetmanate the Zaporozhian Cossacks continued in existence in a territory that included what was to become Yekaterinoslav (now Dnipropetrovsk) and stretched across into the west bank of the Dnieper, bordering on the territory held by the Crimean Tatars. They too had been allied with Ivan Mazepa and Charles XII in the Battle of Poltava and had to take refuge with the Tatars in Crimea. They returned but under tighter control from Moscow. Starting in 1752, Moscow began a policy of settling Serbs in their territory. As in the hetmanate, there was a continual process of converting the Cossack leadership into a landed aristocracy.

Following the account in the Encyclopedia: 'After the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–74 and the Peace Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca [when Russia got control of Crimea - PB], the liquidation of Ukrainian autonomy gained new impetus. The Zaporozhian New Sich was destroyed by Russian troops in 1775; many of the dispersed Zaporozhian Cossacks fled and established the Danubian Sich and the vast lands of Southern Ukraine were incorporated into the Russian Empire as part of New Russia gubernia and Azov gubernia and developed by their governor Grigorii Potemkin. Catherine promoted the settlement of these largely unpopulated areas by Germans, Serbs, Mennonites, Bulgarians and others, and the establishment of several new cities on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov to attract foreign trade.'

This is broadly the territory which is being occupied by the Russians at the time of writing.

We have come to the eve of the Polish partitions when, particularly in the 1793 and 1795 partitions, Russia got hold of most of the area that is now modern Ukraine, West of the Dnieper. It is quite clear, I think, that we are talking about a people who, despite their common origins, are quite distinct from the Russians and who maintained their own Orthodox culture despite the considerable pressure put on them to become Poles. The process by which they develop a sense of themselves as a coherent nation will be looked at in the following article.

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<sup>12</sup> I am for the moment unable to explain why Belarus has a moral and political existence separate from Ukraine - its history is very similar but of course it wasn't on the frontier with the Tatars and didn't have Cossacks. It seems therefore to have been more thoroughly integrated into the Polish system. While the Cossacks were hostile to any hint of Catholicism, the Uniate Church was well established in Belarus.