

SOLZHENITSYN'S TWO CENTURIES TOGETHER, Part 21

WHO ARE THE UKRAINIANS? - Part three, - 'End of the 'long nineteenth century'

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CLASS POLITICS

So. The 'Ruthenians' in Austria and the 'Ukrainians' in Russia had it in common that they were both mainly peasant societies. They had lost their native aristocracy (it had effectively become Polish) and they hadn't been in a position to develop a bourgeoisie. There was a Polish artisan class in Galicia but otherwise the role of artisan, shopkeeper etc was mostly taken by Jews. Thus, although in Galicia a political consciousness (nationalist or socialist) could develop among the Poles on the basis of the aristocracy and artisan classes, for the Ruthenian/ Ukrainians it was concentrated on small numbers of University students.

There was, however, a difference between the two peasantries. The Russian side included large numbers of peasants who had escaped from serfdom in Galicia, who had maintained their Orthodoxy in defiance of those of their priests who had converted to the Uniate/Greek Catholic Church, and who had joined the Cossacks - either the official Cossacks mostly west of the Dnieper, or the unofficial 'Zaporozhian' Cossacks mostly to the East - in conditions of almost perpetual warfare with the Tatars.

Despite their Orthodoxy, and despite the development of an impressive intellectual Orthodox centre in the Kiev-Moghila Academy, it is doubtful if these Eastern Ukrainians, soon to be incorporated into the Russian Empire, were well supplied with, or well organised by, an Orthodox priesthood (for what it's worth Gogol in *Taras Bulba* portrays their Orthodoxy as little more than a badge of identity). The distinct Ukrainian - intellectually European - Orthodoxy that developed in Kiev had, as we have seen, been tasked by Peter with the job of educating the wider Russian Church.

At the same time, under Peter (who took the territory East of the Dnieper) and Catherine (who had the territory West of the Dnieper as well as the territory to the South previously held by the Tatars), the Cossack tradition seems to have been successfully tamed, with the Cossack chiefs becoming landlords and the footsoldiers reduced to serfdom - hence the complaints of Shevchenko's poetry. And yet something of the independent Cossack tradition remained, ready to spring up again with the collapse of Tsarism in the twentieth century.

In Galicia, by contrast, the Greek Catholic Church became the organising centre for the Galician Ruthenian peasantry, and was encouraged in this by the Austrian government as a counterweight to the Poles. After the constitutional reform of 1861, when an elected 'diet' was established in Galicia, the Ruthenians were mainly represented by Greek Catholic priests. When National Populist ideas began to spread among the Ruthenian student population they had no way of reaching the peasantry except through the church, which had its own programme for national education and improvement. As a result, populist literature aimed at the peasantry had a clerical character that was profoundly shocking to the Russian Ukrainian Socialist Mikhailo Drahomanov, when he arrived in Galicia in 1875.

The Ruthenian student movement in Galicia, such as it was, was divided between 'Russophiles' and 'National Populists', who could be called 'Ukrainophiles' though the Ruthenians weren't yet defining themselves as 'Ukrainians'. The National Populists had been inspired by Shevchenko's poetry and by the Polish uprising that took place in 1863. Under the 1861 constitution, Galicia was treated as a unit, which meant that it was overwhelmingly Polish in character, despite the promise of a separate Ruthenian dominated Eastern Galicia which had been made in response to Ruthenian loyalty during the earlier Polish rising in 1848. It was the largest crownland in Austria, covering a quarter of the whole area, but very undeveloped in terms of industrial production. There was a population of about 6 1/2 million - 40% Poles, 40% Ruthenian, 10% Jews. The Ruthenians counted in Hegel's terminology (also used by Engels) as 'non-historical peoples' - peoples who had never formed a state and who lacked a nobility, unlike the 'historical' Russians, Germans, Poles, Magyars. By the early 1890s less than 20% of the students in the Universities of Lviv and Cracow were Ruthenian. In the Lviv Polytechnic, there were 83% Poles, 11% Jews and 6% Ruthenians.¹

Nonetheless, the mere fact that, in marked contrast to Russia, there was an elected regional Parliament led Drahomanov to think Galicia had promise. Given the clerical orientation of the National Populists it was actually among the Russophile student group that he made most impact. The Russophile paper *Druh* (Friend) wasn't written in Russian but in the curious Ruthenian language of culture, 'Yazychie.' Drahomanov contributed articles in Russian which the 'Russophiles' had to translate, thus illustrating how far removed they were from Russia. Out of the *Druh* circle Drahomanov recruited two remarkable disciples - Mykhailo Pavlyk and Ivan Franko, both from poor peasant backgrounds, both studying at Lviv University but having great difficulty making ends meet. Drahomanov introduced them to European and Russian radical literature including Chernyshevsky, Lassalle, Mill, Dobroliubov. Pavlyk and Franko converted *Druh* from Yazychie to the peasant language, Ruthenian/Ukrainian, and in the Summer of 1876 the two Ruthenian student clubs united as Ukrainophile. *Druh* lost the financial support it had received from the Russophile establishment and was financed by Drahomanov. It took on a radical Socialist character. Through Pavlyk and Franko and under Drahomanov's influence, Galicia became an important conduit for the smuggling of revolutionary literature, mainly from Switzerland, to Russia.

Drahomanov was a leading member of the 'Kyiv Hromada', described by the Encyclopedia of Ukraine as 'the most important catalyst of the Ukrainian national revival of the second half of the nineteenth century.' Its earliest activities had been devoted to producing educational material for Sunday Schools using the peasants' own language - a similar project to the one undertaken by the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. But that came to an abrupt end in 1863 with the issuing of the 'Valuev Circular.'

Petr Valuev was Russian Minister of the Interior under Alexander II, the 'Tsar-Liberator', responsible in 1860 for the emancipation of the serfs. This, however, had been followed in 1863 by the Polish insurrection. There was no particular suggestion of a Russian Ukrainian sympathy for the Poles or of any great sympathy for Ukrainian separatism, despite the popularity of

¹ The above account is mainly based on John-Paul Himka: *Socialism in Galicia - the emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian radicalism (1860-1890)*, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983.

Shevchenko. But the Polish rising illustrated the dangers of separate national identities. Already in July 1862, Valuev had written to Alexander Golovnin, the Minister for Public Education calling on him to ban Yiddish publications and the use of Yiddish in education:

"[the ban] will prevent the further literary development of the slang [zhargon] and thus remove the possibility of it ever becoming the means for expressing those concepts that the Jews will, with the expansion of education among them, adopt from Russian and German books. [The ban] will thus promote a gradual replacement of the slang by Russian ..."²

Golovnin opposed this ban but by 1863 Valuev's ministry had taken over the administration of censorship from the Education Ministry and he was in a position to move against Ukrainian. As with Yiddish, Ukrainian was regarded as not a real language - 'nothing but Russian corrupted by the Polish influence.' The aim was 'to license for publication only such books in this language that belong to the realm of fine literature; at the same time, the authorisation of books in Little Russian with either spiritual content or intended generally for primary mass reading should be ceased' (Remy, p.92). So it was not a total ban. The upper classes could read 'fine literature' in the peasant language but it couldn't be used as a medium for the education or spiritual edification of the peasants themselves. Thus an obstacle was placed between the Ukrainian cultured class and the peasantry which contrasts with the role of the Greek Catholic priesthood in Galicia. The Valuev Circular, which was simply an administrative measure, was strengthened in 1876 by the 'Ems Decree' which widened the range of material that was banned (anything of an informative, non-literary nature) and gave it legislative force. The ban on the popular or educational use of the Ukrainian language continued until 1905.

Although the Kyiv Hromada was formally banned early in 1863 it continued in existence, concentrating on cultural activities and historical research. Drahomanov joined in 1869 and in 1873 was instrumental in establishing the 'Southwestern Branch of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society.' He also edited a daily newspaper, the Kievan Telegraph, a Ukrainophile rival to the Russian Conservative paper, Kievlanin. With his colleague, Volodymyr Antonovych, he published a two volume 'Historical Songs of the Little Russian People', following it in 1876 with 'Little Russian Folk Legends and Tales.' But 1876 and the Ems Decree saw the suppression of the Kievan Telegraph and of the Southwestern Branch of the Geographical Society and Drahomanov dismissed from his post in Kiev University. When he went West (in his dealings with Galicia he was mainly based in Geneva) it was as a representative of the Kyiv Hromada. He established a Ukrainian language press and published a journal, Hromada (5 vols, 1878-82), 'the first modern Ukrainian political journal', according to the Encyclopedia. He was also involved with the Russian Liberal emigration, editing their journal, Vol'noe Slovo. But the Kyiv Hromada itself, concentrating on cultural studies, broke with him in 1886, not wanting to be associated with his politics.

Which were still more Socialist than Ukrainian separatist - an anarchist Socialism envisaging a federation of free peoples rather than a centralised planned economy (he published collections of letters by Turgenev and Bakunin addressed to Herzen). His disciples Pavlyk and Franko were imprisoned, albeit briefly (Austria being at the time vastly more indulgent in this respect

² Johannes Remy: 'The Valuev Circular and Censorship of Ukrainian Publications in the Russian Empire (1863-1876): Intention and Practice', *Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes*, March-June 2007, Vol. 49, No. 1/2, p.91

than Russia) for their activities and in particular Franko's promising career - he had published a well received collection of stories centred on the oil extracting town of Boryslav - was wrecked. Franko was a social realist of the sort Belinskii would have appreciated were it not that he wrote in Ukrainian.

Their trials made a huge impact without however yet generating a substantial political movement. The problem in Galicia was the lack of a substantial social base for a political movement. Pavlyk and Franko were both heavily involved in the militant movement that was developing among the artisans of Lviv but these were almost entirely Polish. Access to the Ruthenian peasantry still had to pass through the Greek Catholic Church.

But that was changing, largely through the Church's own efforts. As an alternative to the tavern the Church was establishing Reading Clubs, which soon spread like wildfire. In Himka's account (p.122):

'There were only a handful of these clubs in the 1870s, but hundreds in the 1870s and thousands by the turn of the century. In the reading club, the minority of literate peasants would read aloud to their unlettered neighbours. They read popular newspapers and booklets filled with information on saints, agricultural technique and, especially, politics. The peasant began to be aware of his or her national identity so that in a very real sense the growth of the network of reading clubs was synonymous with the growth of the nation.'

Nothing of the sort, of course, was happening in Russia. There was an impressive intellectual élite researching history and folklore but prevented by government policy from making much contact with the folk; there was a conspiratorial elite which, after the failed attempt to 'go to the people', was now engaged in terrorist activity on the people's behalf (but so far as I can see this didn't yet engage any specifically Ukrainian cause); and there was the folk themselves whose frustrations towards the end of the century were taking the form of spontaneous anti-Jewish pogroms. It could be argued that this was at least partly a consequence of the government's policy of preventing popular education in the people's own language, cutting off the connections that could have been formed between the University educated class and the peasantry.

The period covered by Himka's book on 'Socialism in Galicia' ends in 1890, the year which saw the formation of the first Ukrainian political party. This was the 'Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party', established in Lviv in October, inspired by the ideas of Drahomanov, Pavlyk and Franko, though Drahomanov himself thought it was premature and never formally joined. It was at that congress that the question of an independent Ukrainian national state was first raised. Viacheslav Budzynovs'kyi (1868-1935) proposed as a maximum demand the unification of all the Ukrainian territories in an independent state and as a minimum demand, the division of Galicia into two parts, one Polish and one Ukrainian.³ Prior to this the most radical Ukrainian demand had been for autonomy within a Pan-Slavic state. It was because documents arguing for this were found in their possession that the members of the Society of SS Cyril and Methodius had been sent into exile in the 1840s. Drahomanov also advocated Ukrainian autonomy within a wider federation and this was generally the position favoured by the Radical Party. Budzynovs'kyi got no support for his motion but he did get some support from a

³ John-Paul Himka: 'Young radicals and independent statehood: the idea of a Ukrainian nation state, 1890-95', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 41, No.2, Summer 1982, pp.220-1.

group of his fellow students in Vienna who produced an open letter calling for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. Franko and Pavlyk replied, arguing that the proposal would only serve 'the interests of those strata who would be the first to benefit from the eventual establishment of an independent Ruthenian state, whereas the fate of the working people in this independent state could even deteriorate.'

1895, however, saw the publication of what is widely regarded as the first serious argument for an independent Ukraine - *Ukrainia irredenta*, by another young radical (he had supported Budzunovs'kyi in 1890 but, as a gymnasium student, didn't have the right to vote), Iulian Bachyns'kyi (1870-??, the question marks meaning of course that he ended up in the Soviet Union). This argued for 'a free, great, politically independent Ukraine, politically independent from the San to the Caucasus.' The San is a tributary of the Vistula on the Polish side of the current Polish-Ukrainian border. Things were moving quickly. In December 1895 the Radical Party adopted a resolution similar to the one put forward by Budzunovs'kyi in 1890 and 1899 saw the emergence of two new Ukrainian parties with a Nationalist programme - the National Democratic Party and the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (Bachyns'kyi was a founder member). In 1900 a series of articles calling for independence was published in the main Ukrainian language newspaper, *Dilo*, Franko published a pamphlet - *Beyond the bounds of the possible* - in support of it and a mass student rally was held in Lviv on July 14.

Himka interprets this as a development in Socialist thinking towards Marxism. Drahomanov as a follower of Bakunin, was suspicious of any centralised state. By 1900 the argument had developed that Socialism could only develop on the basis of industrial capitalism and the Ukrainians could never develop industrial capitalism so long as they were part of a larger state having to compete with Bohemia or Vienna. Pavlyk and Franko had criticised Budzunovs'kyi and Bachyns'kyi not as nationalists but as Marxists. Nonetheless, Himka says (*Young Radicals*, p.230), 'Drahomanov, in a sense, broke the ground for the advocacy of independence.' In the mid 1870s, he says (p.233), there was no talk of independence: 'A handful of intellectuals in the cities was involved in a cultural nationalism that had little connection with the overwhelming majority of the nation, the peasantry.' It was the church that was providing the connection between its own intelligentsia and the peasantry through the establishment of the reading room as an alternative to the tavern. But Drahomanov formed a radical intelligentsia able to take advantage of the reading rooms for the development of secular politics. In summary Himka says (p.235):

'Ukrainian statehood was first championed in Galicia, where the constitution and the existence of a nationally conscious clergy permitted the sort of development described above [the formation of the Reading Room movement, 'Prosvita' - PB]. Where this development was lacking, as in Russian-ruled Ukraine, the great majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia could not see beyond federalism, until war and revolution opened their eyes.'

JABOTINSKY AND THE UKRAINIANS

In 1904, Vladimir Jabotinsky, then known as a popular journalist who had only recently publicly declared support for Zionism, published an article in the St Petersburg journal *Obrazovanie*, in which he described a journey through central Ukraine in a third class carriage shared with Ukrainian peasants:

"Even though I myself am not a Little Russian or a Slav, I have the urge to shout to the entire Slavic world: 'Why are you allowing [the little Russian language to die]? There is a mischief [being perpetrated] right in front of your very eyes, a loss to Slavic well-being.' Every nation and nationality has "the right to remain what it is," he emphasised, "and to be called publicly by its national name."⁴

He was already convinced that a Jewish state outside the Russian Empire, preferably in Palestine, was necessary - he had attended the 6th Zionist Conference in Basel in 1903. But in the wake of the 1905 revolution, when (following the most horrific pogrom so far in Ukraine, discussed in an earlier article in this series⁵) political agitation in Russia became much easier, Jabotinsky advocated a policy of pressing for 'complete' rights for Jews within Russia and for Russia itself to become a multinational state. This was the policy he argued for at the Helsingfors Conference of Russian Zionists in 1906 - 'the peak Zionist experience of my youth', as he calls it in his autobiography, *The Story of my life*:

'the bold demands that I would advocate the next day in my speech at the conference: that there is no dominant nation in Russia, that all her nationalities are nothing but "minorities" — Russians, as well as Poles, Tatars, and ourselves, all have equal status, with all deserving self-government.'⁶

Ukraine had an important role to play in Jabotinsky's thinking. If 'Little Russians' (Ukrainians) and 'White (Belo-) Russians' were counted as 'Russians', then the Russians were a majority in the Russian Empire. If they were counted as separate nationalities then, Jabotinsky believed, the 'Russians' ('Great Russians') were just another minority. As he was to say in 1911 (Andriewsky, p.255):

'The resolution of the debate concerning the national character of Russia depends almost entirely on the position that the thirty-million-strong Ukrainian people will assume. If they allow themselves to be Russified - Russia will go one way, if they refuse - it will have to go another.'

In 1907 Jabotinsky wanted to stand for a constituency in Volhynia, Western Ukraine, in the elections for the Second Duma. According to the account by his friend and biographer Joseph Schechtman, he had the support of Ukrainian leaders and after winning the first round of elections, he 'hoped to form an alliance with the Ukrainian peasant deputies against the Polish and Russian landlords in the second round. It immediately became apparent that this would be impossible, however, when all sixty-nine peasant deputies arrived at the provincial electoral college wearing Union of Russian People badges.' (Andriewsky, p.253, fn.15. The Union of

⁴ Olga Andriewsky: 'Vladimir Jabotinsky and the Ukrainian Question, 1904-1914' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, December 1990, Vol. 14, No. 3/4, p.252.

⁵ Peter Brooke: 'Solzhenitsyn and the 'Russian Question', Part 18 - The pogroms, part seven - Odessa in 1905', *Church and State*, No.146, October-December, 2021. Accessible at <http://www.peterbrooke.org/politics-and-theology/solzhenitsyn/pogroms-7/>

⁶ Vladimir Jabotinsky: *Story of my life*, edited by Brian Horowitz and Leonid Katsis, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 2016. I have it in a Kindle edition that doesn't give page references.(Kindle loc. 1908). The Hebrew original was published in 1936. The English translation was found in the Jabotinsky archive in Tel Aviv but the translator has not been identified.

Russian People were the anti-semitic monarchist party often referred to as the 'Black Hundreds').

According to his own account (Story of my life, loc 1954): 'In Volhynia, the Black Hundreds won, as well as in the other western districts, so that the Jewish Pale of Settlement contributed to a mighty contingent of inveterate Jew-haters to the Second Duma.'

This illustrates the dilemma of Ukrainian nationalism in the period - the lack of contact there was between the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia and the peasantry. As we have seen, a connection had been established in Austrian Galicia, initially by means of the Greek Catholic clergy and the 'Prosvita' organisation of reading clubs established as an alternative to the - largely Jewish run - taverns. In Russian Ukraine, the restrictions on the use of the Ukrainian language - the Valuev Circular of 1863 and the Ems Decree of 1876 - were deliberately conceived to prevent such a development taking place, to prevent the intelligentsia from communicating with the peasantry in their own language. Nor was it really in the mentality of the Orthodox Church to think of anything so practical as a network of reading clubs, whether in the Ukrainian peasant language or as a means of promoting Russian. The peasantry was left to its own devices in a raw confrontation with largely foreign (Polish) landlords and largely foreign (Jewish) middlemen.

In the wake of the 1905 revolution, censorship and the restrictions on the language were eased but the advance of the language was still slow. A number of Ukrainian papers were closed down almost immediately:

'As early as 27 January 1907, the tsarist authorities issued a secret circular banning the distribution of Ukrainian-language periodicals among their subscribers by seizing the latest issues at provincial post offices, harassing the subscribers, firing them from government jobs, and blacklisting them. From 1910 onward, the local priests were required to forbid their parishioners to subscribe to the "bad press" or even read Ukrainian newspapers. In 1911, the governor of Kyiv province banned the circulation of Ukrainian periodicals among members of the peasant cooperatives because they were purportedly written in a "newly created, so-called Ukrainian language." The number of Ukrainian intellectuals interested in the new periodicals appears to have been strikingly small - one could identify almost all the Ukrainian leaders by name. There were no journalists of high caliber due to the lack of professional education. Furthermore, the printing houses did not have enough typesetters capable of working with Ukrainian texts.'

The problem was compounded by the lack of an agreed standard Ukrainian literary language and the question to what extent use could be made of the - Polish inflected - standard language that had developed in Galicia.

Jabotinsky had been in Vienna in 1907-8, studying the multinational organisation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He was eventually to earn a law degree in 1912 for a thesis - *State and nation* - on the legal aspects of national autonomy. It was the example of Galicia that he took as definitive proof that the Ukrainians were a nation (Andriewsky, pp.252-3):

⁷ Andrii Danylenko: 'The "Doubling of Hallelujah" for the "Bastard Tongue": The Ukrainian Language Question in Russian Ukraine, 1905-1916', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 2017-2018, Vol. 35, No. 1/4, p.65.

"The independent development of Ukrainian culture is an indisputable fact - and an official one only two steps from here, in Galicia," he subsequently argued in the Odessa press. "Literature, the theatre, and the press aside, instruction in elementary schools and several gymnasiums there is conducted in this language despite all the restrictions and limitations imposed by the Polish nobility who rule the land. At Lviv University, several courses are taught in this language, and now the question of establishing a special Ruthenian university is being discussed. Finally, the courts and the bureaucracy are obliged to conduct hearings in this language in Eastern Galicia." The implications of this for Russia, as far as Jabotinsky was concerned, were clear. "Russia cannot impede all of this, and therefore the question of whether Ukrainian language 'can' or 'should' create a separate culture is superfluous."

AND PETER STRUVE

In 1911 the question of a Ukrainian national culture was raised in a controversy between Jabotinsky and Peter Struve. Struve was at the time one of the leading theorists of the Constitutional Democratic Party - the 'Cadets'. In an earlier phase of his life he had been, together with Lenin, one of the leading theorists, at the moment of its formation, of the Russian Social Democratic and Labour Party. Struve's biographer, Richard Pipes, complains that 'The Ukraine was always Struve's blind spot.' But he explains Struve's position very clearly:

'Struve believed that a pervasive sense of national identity capable of overriding social, ethnic, and political divisiveness was essential to Russia's survival. He thought that the Russia of his time was not as yet a fully formed nation, but only a nation in *statu nascendi*: he once described it, using an American expression, as a "nation in the making." Like the United States, the Russian Empire consisted of diverse ethnic groups, and like it, he believed, it was being forged into a single nation by the unity of culture, in which Russian culture performed the same function as English culture did in America. The on-going process of cultural integration enabled him to argue that despite its ethnic heterogeneity Russia was not a multinational empire like Austria-Hungary with which it was often compared, but a genuine national state (or "national empire") like Great Britain and the United States. Given his views that Russia's national unity was determined not ethnically but culturally and that cultural amalgamation was still in progress, it is not surprising that he should have attached such importance to the maintenance of the unity of Russian culture: the latter was a precondition for Russia's political and moral recovery as well as for her future development as a great power. He regarded a single culture as even more important to Russia's future than unified statehood - hence, political separatism was to him less pernicious than cultural separatism. The Ukrainian national movement struck at the heart of this conception. To have conceded the existence of a Ukrainian culture alongside an all-Russian culture, or to have reduced all-Russian culture to its narrowly ethnic "Great Russian" manifestations, would have undermined the very premise on which his notion of the future of a great Russia rested: "If the question of the separation of the non-Russian nationalities has an exclusively political interest, then the Ukrainian movement, by contrast, confronts us with cultural separatism," a much more dangerous threat:

"Should the intelligentsia's 'Ukrainian' idea . . . strike the national soil and set it on fire . . . [the result will be] a gigantic and unprecedented schism of the Russian nation, which, such is my deepest conviction, will result in veritable disaster for the state and for the people. All our

'borderland' problems will pale into mere bagatelles compared to such a prospect of bifurcation and ... should the 'Belorussians' follow the 'Ukrainians' - 'trifurcation' of Russian culture.'"⁸

The controversy concerning Jabotinsky began, unsurprisingly, not with the Ukrainian question but with the Jewish question. In 1909, a Russian novelist, Evgenii Chirikov, had declared that Jews had little to contribute to Russian culture because they could not understand or enter into the experience of what it was to be Russian. Jewish writers protested, insisting on their own deep attachment to Russian culture. When Jabotinsky weighed in, however, he could hardly, as a Zionist and cultural separatist, be expected to defend Jewish identification with Russia. Instead, he launched an attack on the Russian liberal press, which had held aloof from the controversy, accusing them not of antisemitism but of 'asemitism', of effectively pretending that the Jews as a distinct people and therefore as a 'problem', didn't exist. Since the Jews and the Jewish problem did exist, this meant that the only people addressing it, apart from some Jews such as himself, were the antisemites.

According to the account by Olga Andriewsky (p.259):

'Jabotinsky's scathing indictment of the Russian intelligentsia, published as it was in *Slovo* [a leading liberal journal - PB], excited an immediate and passionate response in intellectual circles throughout the empire. In the words of Joseph Schechtman, Jabotinsky's biographer, fellow Zionist, and life-long friend, these four essays, with their penetrating analysis of Jewish interests, had an "almost revolutionary impact on Jewish intellectual circles." The reaction in Ukrainian circles was vivid as well. The leaders of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives (Tovarystvo ukrains'kykh postupovtsiv or TUP), who were themselves engaged in an ongoing struggle against the Russian intelligentsia's "conspiracy of silence," welcomed the Jewish publicist's frankness enthusiastically. Among other things, Jabotinsky's timely remarks underscored their own growing conviction that the Russian intelligentsia simply did not treat the nationalities problem seriously. As *Rada*, the leading Ukrainian-language daily, noted: "It can only be hoped that this polemic concerning the nationalities question that is currently being conducted with such emotion on the pages of the Russian progressive press will enlighten [Russians] about the true state of affairs and will help the progressive elements of all nations to reach an understanding more quickly so that [our] common forces can better fight for universal human ideals."

Rada was, between 1906 and 1914, the only Ukrainian language daily paper. The Society of Ukrainian Progressives had been formed out of a series of shortlived clandestine Ukrainian political groups - the Brotherhood of Taras (formed in 1891), which gave way in 1897/8 to the General Ukrainian Non-Party Democratic Organisation which, in 1904, became the Ukrainian Democratic Party which, in 1905, fused with its own breakaway, the Ukrainian Radical Party to form the Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party. Also associated with the TUP (the Progressives) was the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, formed out of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party which was another derivative from the Non-Party Democratic Organisation. The Ukrainian Social Democratic Party included among its leadership Dmytro Dontsov who was to become a leading theorist of Ukrainian Fascism in Polish Galicia in the 1920s, together with Volodymyr

⁸ Richard Pipes: 'Peter Struve and Ukrainian Nationalism', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 1979-1980, Vol. 3/4, Part 2, pp.675-6. The essay is actually an extract from Pipes's book *Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905-1944* which had not yet been published.

Vynnychanko and Simon Petliura. Petliura in particular was part of the editorial secretariat of *Rada* and, together with Vynnychenko, of the elected council of the TUP.⁹

STRUVE AND THE UKRAINIANS

Struve's confrontation with Ukrainian nationalism began in earnest in 1911. He seems to have accepted Jabotinsky's view that the national question needed to be addressed and to have invited him to contribute an article - *The Jews and their attitude* - to his own paper, *Russkaia Mysl'*, in January 1911. But Jabotinsky's argument that the Great Russians were only a minority in a country made up of national minorities, and that the Jews knew very little about the Great Russians - their main experience was of Little Russians and Belorussians - prompted a speedy reply repudiating the term 'Great Russian' and insisting instead on the term 'All-Russian' - a single nation with regional variations.

Through 1911, as the debate was joined by a Ukrainian separatist writing anonymously, it turned on the question of language, Struve insisting that Russian, which had already established itself as a language of culture, had to be the 'koine', or common language, and that Ukrainian, in its different varieties, could never be anything other than a colourful regional *patois*. The case was developed in a major essay in 1912 on *The Common Russian culture and Ukrainian particularism*. Andriewsky suggests that the debate may have inspired Lenin, always attentive to whatever Struve might be doing, to write his own *Theses on the National Question* (1913). This was closely followed by Stalin's *Marxism and the national question* which endorses Ukrainian national autonomy, comparing the relationship between Ukraine and Russia with the relationship between Ireland and Britain:

'But the nations which had been pushed into the background and had now awakened to independent life, could no longer form themselves into independent national states; they encountered on their path the very powerful resistance of the ruling strata of the dominant nations, which had long ago assumed the control of the state. They were too late!...

'In this way the Czechs, Poles, etc., formed themselves into nations in Austria; the Croats, etc., in Hungary; the Letts, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, etc., in Russia. What had been an exception in Western Europe (Ireland) became the rule in the East.

'In the West, Ireland responded to its exceptional position by a national movement. In the East, the awakened nations were bound to respond in the same fashion.

'Thus arose the circumstances which impelled the young nations of Eastern Europe on to the path of struggle ...

'The only correct solution is regional autonomy, autonomy for such crystallised units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc.'

The national question became urgent with the outbreak of war with Austria and Germany, especially once Russia invaded Austria, and Eastern Galicia came under its control. On 1st August 1914, the three main political parties in Galicia - the National Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Radical Party and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party - formed a 'Supreme

⁹ This is put together out of the relevant entries in the online Encyclopaedia of Ukraine.

Ukrainian Council' which organised the 'Ukrainian Sich Riflemen' as a unit in the Austrian army. They were joined by the 'Union for the Liberation of Ukraine', representing Ukrainians under Russian domination, mostly Socialists. The Union (SVU, from its name in Ukrainian) was led by, among others, Dmytro Dontsov. Though originally centred in Lviv it moved, together with the Supreme Council, to Vienna (where the Supreme Council became the 'General Ukrainian Council') According to the account in the Encyclopaedia of Ukraine:

'As a result of its efforts about 50,000 prisoners of war in Germany and 30,000 in Austria were provided with hospitals, schools, libraries, reading rooms, choirs, orchestras, theaters, and courses in political economics, co-operative management, Ukrainian history and literature, and German language. Various newspapers were established, including *Rozsvit* (printed in Rastatt), *Vil'ne slovo* (Salzwedel), *Hromads'ka dumka* (Wetzlar), *Rozvaha* (Freistadt), and *Nash holos* (Josefstadt). A number of educational brochures were also published.'

The POW camps thus provided the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia with the opportunity that had always been denied them in Russia to make contact with the Ukrainian-speaking populace.

Struve was alarmed by a speech given by a Ukrainian deputy in the Austrian Parliament 'calling for the creation of a Ukrainian buffer state that could isolate "Muscovite Russia" from the Black Sea.' (Pipes, p.679). He launched into a ferocious polemic against the liberals, including members of his own Cadet Party, who were prepared to acknowledge Ukrainian claims to a separate culture - the disagreement with his fellow Cadets eventually resulted in his resignation from the Cadet Party's Central Committee. In December 1914 he travelled to newly occupied Galicia and on his return argued that the so-called Ukrainian culture in Galicia, like the Greek Catholic Church, was 'nothing more than a "surrogate culture", originally created by the Orthodox population of the area as a weapon against Polish domination ... A deep and broad *Russification* of Galicia is necessary and unavoidable.'" (Pipes, p.681).

The Russian administration seems to have agreed, especially after the first occupation governor, the Polonophile Sergei Sheremet'ev was replaced by Georgii Bobrinskii, a relative of the Galician Russophile leader Count Vladimir Bobrinskii. Street and place names were changed, the Shevchenko Scientific Society was closed down, the popular Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church, Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, was arrested and deported. Ukrainian writers associated with the journal *Dnister*, and the newspaper *Dilo* were arrested:

'In general the Ukrainian movement was crushed: the press was suspended, the Ukrainian national colours were banned, copies of Taras Shevchenko's "incendiary" collection of poems, *Kobzar*, were confiscated, and several hundred members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were arrested.'¹⁰

ANTI-SEMITISM IN EASTERN GALICIA

The Russian occupation also saw what may have been the first major anti-Jewish Ruthenian pogrom in Eastern Galicia. Austria in the area had inherited the same Polish division of labour

¹⁰ Mark von Hagen: 'Wartime Occupation and Peacetime Alien Rule: "Notes and Materials" toward a(n) (Anti-) (Post-) Colonial History of Ukraine', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 2015-2016, Vol. 34, No. 1/4, p.158.

as Russia - Polish Catholic landowners, Orthodox (or Greek Catholic) Ruthenian-Ukrainian peasants, Jewish middlemen. In Polish dominated Western Galicia, where the Polish population covered a wider range of class divisions, there were violent Polish-Jewish clashes, notably on a very wide scale covering more than 400 communities in 1898. But according to a Lithuanian historian, Daniel Staliunas:

'In Eastern Galicia under Austrian rule, as in Lithuania, there were very few pogroms. Historians mention only a few, mostly in 1898 in Tłuste, Barsztyn, Borszczow, and Przemyśl. However, even during these outbursts those responsible were not the local Ruthenians but "Mazurians," that is, immigrant Catholic workers from Western Galicia (i.e., Poles).'¹¹

He cites John-Paul Himka, from an article I haven't been able to read, saying that 'the reason lies in the politicisation of the Ukrainian-Jewish conflict. In other words, the Ukrainian national movement impressed upon the peasantry, which formed its base, the idea that civilised means should be used to fight the Jews, namely, that the movement should set up educational and commercial institutions and boycott Jewish trade. Himka suggests that this propaganda was effective.' (pp.291-2)

However, as the last article in this series has shown, again following Himka, it was only towards the end of the nineteenth century that the radical intelligentsia - socialist or nationalist - began to get a purchase on the peasantry. The credit for developing a political-economic alternative to the pogrom belongs to the Greek Catholic clergy, providing the 'Prosvita' reading rooms as an alternative to the largely Jewish run tavern. Elsewhere Himka says:

'While Orthodox priests immediately across the Russian border in the Right-Bank Ukraine remained steeped in a superstitious prejudice against Jews, and while by the end of the nineteenth century Roman Catholic priests in Western (Polish) Galicia adopted a more modern version of anti-Semitism, the Greek Catholic clergy of Galicia did not promote religious or racial anti-Semitism. When, in the course of building the national movement in the village, Greek Catholic priests did agitate against Jews, their agitation remained on the socioeconomic and political plane: priests opposed taverns, which Jews ran; they opposed private money-lending, in which Jews predominated, and encouraged the peasants to form credit unions instead; they urged Ukrainian peasants to gain a foothold in commerce, particularly to organise cooperative stores, which brought them into conflict with Jewish merchants; and they supported Ukrainian candidates to parliament and diet, whereas Jews were involved in electoral agitation for Polish candidates. The attitude of the Greek Catholic clergy toward the Jews was in fact very reminiscent of that of Joseph II, who promulgated religious toleration but took measures to counteract what he considered the negative economic role of Galician Jews and to insure their conformity to the state idea (as the Ukrainians wanted them to conform to their national idea). This is not the place to judge the policies of either Joseph II or the Greek Catholic clergy toward

¹¹ Darius Staliunas: 'Jew-Hatred and Anti-Jewish Violence in the Former Lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Long Nineteenth Century', taken from Antony Polonsky, Hanna Węgrzynek, Andrzej Żbikowski (eds): *New Directions in the History of the Jews in the Polish Lands*, Academic Studies Press, 2018, p.290.

Jews; I only wish to call attention to their similarity, which may be an indication of how formative the enlightenment period was for the Greek Catholic church.¹²

THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION

It seems unlikely, however, that there was no real antisemitism in a society in which, according to the Ukrainian writer Ivan Franko, Jews controlled over 60% of the industry and 90% of the trade¹³ and, given the opportunity provided by the Russian occupation, it seems to have broken free with a vengeance:

'upon arriving in towns and villages, Russian units conveyed to Poles and Ukrainians that they had come to free Galicia from the "Jewish yoke." In some instances the Russians incited the local population to anti-Jewish excesses or, after having looted Jewish stores and houses, distributed the booty to the villagers and townspeople ...

'Having been invested by the Tsar with supreme powers in the front-zone, Stavka embarked upon dismantling the Austrian state system and integrating the occupied territories into the Russian imperial structure. Such measures entailed depriving Eastern Galicia of its specific "Austrian" features such as the "privileged" position of the Jews. By removing them from the provincial socioeconomic sphere the military conceived of "leveling" Galician Jews to put them on a par with their Russian co-religionists. Concomitantly, the pogroms were accompanied by a whole cluster of rituals that involved the degradation and humiliation of Jews, heralding the introduction of the new political order. Under the conniving eyes of the officers, the Cossacks and soldiers forced Jews to dance, ride on pigs—insulting the sensibilities of religious Jews—crawl, and run naked. Violence thus became a part of a socioeconomic and psychological campaign to relegate Jews to second-class status ...

'For soldiers and the Cossacks violence also became an expedient tool to make up for hardship and supply shortages, especially as communication lines were extended to the limit ... Time and again the *modus operandi* of the pogromists was almost identical: a charge of some "treacherous act", such as allegations of shooting at the troops from Jewish houses or shops, would be followed in quick succession by plunder, rape and massacre.

'Since robbery was a ubiquitous element of the pogroms, greed could partially explain the participation of the local population in attacks. From the outset of hostilities, the news of the Russian invasion forced many Jews to flee Galicia. Their abandoned property attracted the throngs of looters, who were encouraged by the Cossacks and soldiers. Some individuals also guided the Russians to Jewish houses, where they together robbed the residents and divided the booty.'¹⁴

¹² John-Paul Himka: 'The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building in Galicia, 1772-1918', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, December 1984, Vol. 8, No. 3/4, pp. 432-3.

¹³ Yaroslav Hrytsak: 'A Strange case of antisemitism: Ivan Franko and the Jewish issue' in Omar Bartov and Eric D.White (eds): *Shatterzone of Empires - Coexistence and violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Empires*, Indiana University Press, 2013, p.234.

¹⁴ Alexander V. Prusin: 'A "Zone of violence" - the anti-Jewish pogroms in Eastern Galicia in 1914-1915 and 1941', *Shatterzone*, pp.368-9.

The situation became worse for both Jews and non-Jews with the defeat of the Russian forces in 1915:

'The Russian retreat soon turned into a rout and in June the Austrians recaptured Lwów. To deprive the enemy of human and material resources, the Russian High Command initiated a scorched-earth policy, which included the destruction of property along the front line and the forcible evacuation of the population. Conceived as a strategic device, the evacuation soon degenerated into widespread plunder, rape and murder. Acting upon orders to "clean up" the front-zone, the Cossacks and soldiers burned houses and crops, blew up bridges and mills, demolished railroads, and forced the population eastward.' (ibid., pp.369-70).

It is from this point that the story of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia - previously, as part of the Habsburg Empire, relatively privileged - turns into a nightmare: the brief chaotic period of Russian rule, followed by the collapse of the Empire, a long period of subjection to their traditional enemies, the Poles, followed by a very unwilling incorporation into the Soviet Union. It is in this context that we can understand their sympathy for, or at least ambivalent attitude towards, the Germans in the Second World War, and their current militantly anti-Russian nationalism.

The next article in this series will look at the tangled history of Ukraine following the February Revolution in 1917. Jabotinsky will return when he makes a deal with Simon Petliura after the pogroms which occurred while Petliura was briefly in power in Russian Ukraine.